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Abstract—With SDN increasingly becoming an enabling tech-
nology for NFV in the cloud, many virtualized network functions
need to monitor the network state in order to function properly.
An outdated network view at the controllers can impact the
performance of those virtualized network functions. In earlier
work, we identified two main factors contributing to an outdated
network view in the case of a load-balancer: network state
collection and controllers’ state distribution. In this paper, we
anticipate that the impact might be different in case of security
functions. Therefore, we study the impact of an outdated network
view on an anomaly-based IDS application. In particular, we
investigate: (1) the impact of controllers’ state distribution on the
performance of a distributed IDS in the case of a DDoS attack;
and (2) the impact of network state collection on the performance
of an IDS in the case of a TCP SYN flood attack. Our results
showed that the outdated network view had negative impact on
the IDS anomaly-detection performance in the experiments that
we conducted.
Keywords—NFV, SDN, Security, IDS, Performance, Inconsis-
tency.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Network Function Virtualization (NFV) is an emerging
concept in cloud computing that enables network functions to
run virtualized as software instances on the cloud. Software-
Defined Networking (SDN) is a promising network architec-
ture, which simplifies the design of the virtualized network
functions (VNF), and hence it is widely used in the cloud.
In SDN, the control and data planes are decoupled. In order
for applications to function properly, control-planes need to
maintain a global view of the network.
Any inconsistency in the controller’s network view might
have an impact on applications’ performance. In earlier work
[1], we studied how the network state information collected by
the controllers from the data-planes could negatively impact a
load-balancer’s performance. While, Levin et al. [2] studied
how the network state synchronization, in case of distributed
controllers, among controllers could have a negative impact
on a load-balancer’s performance. In this paper, we study the
impact of network view inconsistency on a different network
functions, an Intrusion Detection System (IDS).
In this paper, we make the following contributions: (1)
we investigate the impact of controllers’ state distribution on
the performance of a distributed anomaly-based IDS in the
presence of a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. (2)
we investigate the impact of network state collection on the
performance of the IDS in the presence of a TCP SYN flood.
Our results showed that the IDS function that we evaluated
was negatively impacted by the outdated information. Also,
the type of the attack impacted how the outdated information
affected the IDS.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In §II, we
provide a background on the topic and related work. The setup
of the IDS experiment is presented in §III. We present two
different attack scenarios and their results in §IV and §V.
Finally §VI will be our conclusion and an outline for possible
foreseeable work.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Network State Collection Vs Controllers’ State Distribution
As aforesaid, SDN controllers need to maintain an up-to-
date view of the network in order for the virtualized network
functions to operate properly. To alleviate scalability and
reliability issues in large-scale SDN deployments, recent work
[3], [4] encourages the use of physically distributed SDN
controllers that are logically centralized. Therefore, controllers
rely on two separate sources of state information: (1) data-
planes (switches) which they control, and (2) other control-
planes (controllers) in case of distributed deployments.
In case of single or distributed controller deployments,
controllers need to collect network state information from the
switches in a process known as network state collection. And
in case of distributed controllers, those controllers also need
to exchange network state information in order to keep their
network view up-to-date, in a process known as controllers’
state distribution.
B. Impact of Network View Inconsistency
Together the network state collection and the controllers’
state distribution processes could lead to inconsistency in the
network state information at the controllers. Such inconsis-
tency might have an impact on applications’ performance.
In previous work [1], we showed that network state col-
lection methods (active or passive) can have an impact on
the performance of a load-balancer. Our results showed that
the load-balancer’s performance was affected by the polling
period of network state collection, in case of active network
state collection. However, it was more resilient to the nature of
the traffic load compared to passive flow-based network state
collection.
Using a distributed flow-based load-balancer, which em-
ployed a periodic synchronization of controllers’ state infor-
mation, Levin et al. [2] demonstrated the negative impact
of inconsistent network views at the controllers on the load-
balancer’s performance. Two issues with Levin et al.’s load-
balancer [2] were identified by Guo et al. [5]. First, short
synchronization periods were required for acceptable load-
balancing performance, leading to high synchronization over-
head. Second, their design was vulnerable to forwarding loops
due to the inconsistency of network views at the controllers.
In an attempt to mitigate the first issue with Levin et al.’s
load-balancer [2], Guo et al. [5] proposed a new trigger-based
controller synchronization mechanism designed specifically for
load-balancers called Load Variance-based Synchronization
(LVS). LVS can perform well with lower synchronization
overhead by only synchronizing the controllers when the load
of a specific server exceeds a certain threshold.
Subsequently, we can assume that the network state col-
lection and the controllers’ state distribution altogether could
negatively impact the performance of virtualized network
functions, more specifically load-balancers. Moreover, we an-
ticipate that the impact might be different in case of different
VNFs. Hence, in this paper, we study the impact of incon-
sistency on a different network function rather than a load-
balancer. In particular, we study the impact of inconsistent
network view on a security function, i.e., an IDS.
III. SECURITY NETWORK FUNCTION
The IDS in our experiment is a network anomaly-based
IDS similar to that of [6], which was designed for non-SDNs.
The IDS employs a clustering algorithm to learn about the
behavior of network traffic and to detect the anomalous ones.
Instead of using the NetFlow protocol and the classical K-
Means clustering algorithm as in [6], it uses OpenFlow and
employs a sequential K-Means clustering algorithm (shown
in Algorithm 1). For active network state collection, our
IDS implementation relies on OpenFlow STATS REQUEST
messages. In regards to controllers’ state distribution, a simple
delta-consistency model (i.e., periodic synchronization) was
employed (see [1] for more information).
To evaluate the impact of network view inconsistency on
the IDS, we conducted two scenarios in order to simulate
attacks on servers that are protected by the IDS. First, we
used a set of the clients to launch a DDoS attack (§IV). Then,
we randomly used one of the clients to launch a TCP SYN
flood attack on the servers (§V). As for the traffic generation,
Table I shows the parameters of the employed non-anomalous
traffic (attack traffic will be explained in §IV-A and §V-A).
IV. DDOS ATTACK SCENARIO
A. Setup
In this attack scenario, we used a number of the clients to
simulate the behavior of a DDoS attack. We used a distributed
(i.e., two controllers) active-IDS implementation with a fixed
polling period of 2 seconds in this scenario. The network
topology shown in Fig. 1. The IDS detects any anomalous
behavior by monitoring the traffic arriving at the servers. We
trained the IDS to expect traffic from an average of half the
Algorithm 1: Using Sequential K-means Clustering at
the IDS.
Data: P(p,b,f), a point in the features vector space
Data: T , total number of points
Data: M , number of clusters
Data: Ci, the centroid of the i
th cluster, i ∈ [0,M)
Data: Ni, number of points in the i
th cluster
begin
T ← ∅
if T < M then
CT ← P
NT ← NT + 1
else
ic ← nearest (P , C)
Cic ← (Cic ∗Nic ) + P
Nic ← Nic + 1
Cic ←
Cic
Nic
T ← T + 1
Function nearest (P, C)
Data: wk, weight of vector k, k ∈ {p, b, f}
begin
idx← ∅;min←∞
for i ∈ [0,M) do
d←√
(
Pp−Cip
wp
)2 + (
Pb−Cib
wb
)2 + (
Pf−Cif
wf
)2
if d < min then
idx← i; min← d
return idx
TABLE I: Employed legitimate traffic loads and their param-
eters. r1 and r2 are flow arrival rates for switch 1 and 2,
respectively. p1 and p2 are messages-per-flow arrival rates for
switch 1 and 2, respectively. Payload of any message is 512
bytes.
Parameters
Flows Poisson process
Flows rates r1 = 3f/s, r2 = 4f/s
Flow TTL 2 sec
Msgs-per-flow Poisson process
Msgs-per-flow rates p1 = 34msg/s, p2 = 30msg/s
total number of clients at a given time. The features vector
used for clustering is 3-tuple that is comprised of: (1) the
total number of bytes received by a server (b), (2) the total
number of packets received by a server (p), and (3) the total
number of unique flows received by the server (f ) per polling
duration (2 sec). A weighted (wb = 4096, wp = 64, wf = 1)
Euclidean distance was used as a distance function for the
clustering algorithm. We ran the experiment for 10 runs, in
each run we simulated 5 DDoS (each attack lasts 30 sec)
attacks by allowing the dormant clients to send a CBR traffic
to the servers.
In order to measure the performance of the IDS in this
attack scenario, we use the following performance indicators:
(1) the time to detect an anomalous behavior (Tδ), (2) the
precision (Pδ) (shown in (1)), the recall (Rδ) (shown in (2)),
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Fig. 1: The network topology with two distributed controllers.
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Fig. 2: Venn Diagram for IDS performance indicators. TP is
True Positives, TN is True Negatives, FP is False Positives,
and FN is False Negatives.
and the accuracy (Aδ) of detection (shown in (3)), (3) and the
true positives (TP ), the false positives (FP ), and the false
negatives (FN ) (shown in Fig. 2).
B. Results
Fig. 3 shows that as the synchronization period increases
the true positives (TP) decreases while the false negatives (FN)
increases indicating a degradation in the IDS performance.
However, Fig. 4 shows the synchronization period versus the
average detection time (Tδ). Fig. 5 shows the effect of the
synchronization period on the average precision (Pδ), recall
(Rδ) and accuracy (Aδ). The results shown is those figures
do not necessarily show degradation in the IDS performance
because we had to exclude those runs with infinite detection
time which increases as the synchronization period increases.
Pδ =
TP
TP + FP
(1)
Rδ =
TP
TP + FN
(2)
Aδ =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
(3)
V. TCP SYN ATTACK SCENARIO
A. Setup
In this attack scenario, we used one of the clients to launch
a TCP SYN flood attack on the servers. We used a non-
distributed (i.e., single controller) active-IDS implementation
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Fig. 3: Average True Positives (TP ), False Positives (FP ),
and False Negatives (FN ) for Remote Servers (best viewed in
color).
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Fig. 4: Average detection time (Tδ) for Remote Servers.
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Fig. 5: Average precision (Pδ), recall (Rδ) and accuracy (Aδ)
vs synchronization period (best viewed in color).
in this scenario. The network topology shown in Fig. 6. The
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Fig. 6: The network topology with a single controller.
IDS detects any anomalous behavior by monitoring the traffic
generated by the clients. We trained the IDS to expect traffic
with parameters shown in Table I. The features vector used
for clustering is 3-tuple that is comprised of: (1) the number
of bytes per flow duration (b), (2) the number of packets per
flow duration (p), and (3) the number of unique flows from
the source (f ). A weighted (wb = 2046, wp = 16, wf = 0.25)
Euclidean distance was used as a distance function for the
clustering algorithm. We ran the experiment for 10 runs, in
each run we randomly select one of the clients to launch a
TCP SYN flood attack.
B. Results
In order to measure the performance of the IDS in this
attack scenario, we use the time to detect an anomalous
behavior (Tδ) as our performance indicator. Fig. 7 shows
the effect of the polling period on the performance of the
IDS. The results show that as the polling period increases the
time required to detect the anomalous behavior also increases.
We believe that this is due the following reasons: (1) at the
detection phase, the IDS fails to detect any attack that occurs
between consequent polling periods, and (2) at the training
phase, the polling period affects the number of collected data
points (i.e, the higher the polling period, the less the number
of points collected) used during the IDS training phase, and
hence affects the detection.
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Fig. 7: Average Detection Time vs Polling Period.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Previously [1], we articulated that load-balancers were
affected by the network view inconsistency due to network
state collection. In the case of TCP SYN flood attack (§V),
the IDS exhibited the same behavior as the load-balacers i.e.,
the higher the polling period the worse the performance (due
to reasons discussed in §V-B). It is also worth mentioning that
we tested the effect of synchronization period in the case of a
distributed IDS for the TCP SYN flood attack scenario (§V).
However, that effect was negligible compared to the effect of
the polling period due to the localized nature of the attack i.e.,
an IDS can still detect the presence of the attack even without
any state synchronization between the controllers. Conversely,
in the case of DDoS attack (§IV), the synchronization period
impacted the IDS (like the load-balancer) due the nature of the
attack i.e., malicious clients distributed their traffic through the
two domains.
In summary, this paper demonstrated the impact of network
view freshness at the SDN controllers on a security network
function. Our results indicated that an out-of-date network
view had negative impact on the security network function
we evaluated. However, the impact differed with the attack
scenario. For future work, we plan to investigate how this
impact could be mitigated.
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